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I. Introduction
This study provides American policymakers with strategic insight on how to
embrace Japan as a prime ally in countering a rising China. The post-World
War II order in East Asia, strategically centered on the U. S.Japan bilateral al-
liance, is largely intact. Japan is not only a keystone of U. S. security policy to-
ward East Asia, but also a critical hub of the U. S. global military network of
bases and facilities. Japan also has become a chief supporter of U. S. foreign
policy since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which strained American relations
with Russia, China, and European allies, with the notable exception of the
United Kingdom. The United States needs to anchor Japan in the global net-
work and to utilize its political support and limited but significant military
power as a supplementary or complementary resource to buttress U. S. global
leadership. This challenge is especially acute in East Asia ; the United States
cannot afford to ignore the geo-strategic implications of an impending power
challenge or shift in the region as China gains economic and military strength.
Yet, to many American policymakers, Asia is still a “black box.” Americans
53
MATSUMURA Masahiro
The Japanese State Identity
as a Grand Strategic Imperative*
* 	
		



	





 
!
"#$( #)%
are unfamiliar with Asian history in general, and more specifically, American
policymakers are not fully aware that the Japanese state identity is the primary
determinant of Japan’s vital national interests and therefore drives its grand
strategic choices. Only by grasping this identity from a macro-historical and
geo-political perspective, as fully explored and elaborated in this paper, can the
United States secure Japan as a reliable partner and to effectuate a more dura-
ble bilateral alliance. If the U. S. fails to follow such an approach, or if it
achieves only a superficial understanding, it will alienate Japan and will bring
about the dissolution of the indispensable bilateral alliance.
Confronting a rising China, Japanese strategic thinkers are already changing
their geo-strategic calculations, and will soon have to redefine the Japanese
state identity, the basis of its geo-strategic choices. The People’s Republic of
China has continuously achieved high economic growth and pursued a signifi-
cant military buildup since its 1978 inception of reform and open-door policies
and, as a result, has risen as an emerging great-power aspirant with growing
potential to challenge U. S. predominance in world affairs, particularly in
Northeast Asia. China’s relative power at present remains modest, but it has,
in absolute terms, made remarkable achievements over time, both in macro-
economic indicators and military capabilities. Western and Japanese analysts
expect that a rising China, if it does successfully transmute into an established
great power, will bring about a tectonic shift in the international distribution of
power. Thus they are concerned as to whether China’s rise will eventuate in
a turbulent power transition involving arms races and wars, specifically be-
tween China and the U. S.Japan alliance.
Since it faces structural impediments to its great power aspirations, Beijing
has followed and will follow an approach designed to enhance China’s relative
power through economic growth and development, thereby shrinking the gap
with U. S. and Japanese power. Beijing currently lacks an adequate economic
base to sustain a massive arms buildup, and attempting such a buildup would
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surely invite U. S. counter-offensives in arms buildup which Beijing can never
rival. A state can balance against a potential aggressor either by its own capa-
bilities (internal balancing) or by joining with like-minded states against the
aggressor (external balancing). The long-term internal balancing approach is
the only viable strategy for Beijing, because it cannot find a partner state
which is capable and willing to enter into an alliance against the preponderant
United States.
(１)
Meanwhile, Beijing appears to consider peace and stability essential for its
rise, as shown by its longstanding acquiescence to the status quo of U. S. he-
gemony. But this does not guarantee peace in the long run. When Beijing
identifies an opportunity after the catch-up phase, it could convert economic
and technological power into military capabilities, thereby challenging the
status quo. True, the United States and Japan benefit from trade with and in-
vestment in China during the current catch-up phase. But if this phase does
not transform Beijing’s dictatorship into a stable democracy satisfied with the
existing international order, Washington and Tokyo would turn Beijing to be
a formidable enemy, thereby digging their own grave. Conversely, to treat
Beijing as an enemy now would create a self-fulfilling prophecy : Beijing would
be forced to oppose the two allies to protect its vital interests.
Uncertain of Beijing’s future intentions and capabilities, therefore, Washing-
ton and Tokyo have taken and will continue to take a hedging strategy that
combines containment and engagement, through which they encourage coop-
eration and discourage challenges to the established order. This hedging strat-
egy will be sustainable for the foreseeable future because U. S. and Japanese
combined power will persistently outweigh Chinese power.
Yet hedging is not necessarily sustainable in the longer term, because the
assumptions on which the strategy rests may turn out to be invalid. A joint
hedging strategy assumes that Washington is able and willing to lead Tokyo in
the alliance framework and that Tokyo is prepared to accept the potential risk
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that Washington might shrink from its commitment to Japan’s security (per-
haps due to an unexpectedly rapid decline in U. S. relative power or growing
American isolationism, for example).
Put simply, given current international trends, Japan cannot assume that the
current power constellation will endure and that the United States will remain
committed indefinitely to the defense of Japan. While remaining committed to
the bilateral alliance, Tokyo must envision some scenarios under which the al-
liance cannot protect Japanese interestsa rising China, and adjust ac-
cordingly. Such dynamic thinking is in sharp contrast to the existing static
analyses which take the U. S.Japan alliance for granted and which focus exclu-
sively on fine-tuning within the alliance framework.
(２)
Against this backdrop, this paper will examine Japan’s future strategic
choices as a function of its assessment of U. S. power (ranging from U. S. pre-
dominance to its decline to its debilitation) as compared to China’s power
(ranging from a strong revisionist power to a resilient status quo power to a
debilitated, internally-oriented power). Tokyo’s ultimate choice will be deter-
mined according to its power calculations and its order of preference of geo-
strategic options. Due to the great uncertainty inherent in forecasting the
future, however, Tokyo’s power calculation cannot but be inferred from Japa-
nese macro-historical geo-strategic experiences, and from patterns in Tokyo’s
preferences in past geo-strategic choices.
These past choices reflect what historic Japanese decision-makers consid-
ered would best serve their national interests and encompass their normative
understanding of the ideal Japanese state in world politics. Embedded in the
ranking order, therefore, would be an entrenched sense of the Japanese state
identity, an essential criterion in evaluating geo-strategic options. In this light,
it is crucial to examine how the Japanese state identity has been shaped by the
early Japanese experience with the Sino-centric world order prior to the ad-
vent of Western imperialism in the 19th century. It is also critical to inves-
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tigate how state identity has influenced Tokyo’s geo-strategic choices since
the breakdown of the Sino-centric order in 1895, including its strategies during
the cold war and the post-cold war period.
This paper will first demonstrate that, in countering a rising China, the Japa-
nese macro-historical experience offers Tokyo a reasonably solid base for in-
ferential power calculations and the identification of a renewed Japanese state
identity suited for the emerging geo-strategic landscape in East Asia. Then,
the analysis will turn to Tokyo’s options given different geo-strategic scenar-
ios presented by possible U. S.China power balances, and Tokyo’s ranked
preferences over these options. The discussion will end with policy recom-
mendations designed for American strategic planners on how they can influ-
ence Japanese geo-strategic choices, with a focus on high risks involved in the
scenarios where Japan should face the less-preferred and least-preferred op-
tions.
In this paper, the term “state identity” refers the state’s perception of what
role it should play and what status it should enjoy in international relations,
such as a Western state or a non-Western state on the one hand ; and a super-
power, a great power, or a middle power on the other hand. A state’s identity
may shift over time. Each state’s political leaders must construct such an iden-
tity through practice under inherent domestic constraints－economic growth
and development, technological capabilities, military power, and public opinion,
among others－and in the context of the changing power structure of dynamic
international relations.
For instance, at the time of its independence the United States was a defen-
sive small power, but later became a superpower and a prime global leader of
the free world. Similarly, Japan was a non-Western, pre-modern state－a
deeply traditional and isolationist state that pursued geo-political independ-
ence and autonomy for over two centuries－before the 1868 Meiji Restoration.
But today’s Japan has developed into a global economic power in the Western
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inter-state system that has experienced growing interdependence and globali-
zation. The Japanese state identity since the Meiji Restoration has been, by
and large, focused on modernization and development. Socio-economic consid-
erations have outweighed military and creedal factors, except during the
interbellum period and the Second World War. Such an identity has been based
on a veiled sense of raison , which is to transform the neighboring East
Asian region, including China. This impulse is comparable to the U. S. mis-
sionary zeal in spreading freedom and democracy.
State identity is distinguished from national identity, which implies a sense
of unity among a population that shares common historical experiences, ethnic
backgrounds, cultural heritages, languages, creedal commitments and /or other
characteristics. Certainly, national identity may be closely related to state
identity, due to the former’s implications for the latter. Yet the two concepts
are distinct. State identity also differs from kokutai, or the political regime of
the pre-1945 Japanese state, because the latter concept focuses on the organ-
izing mechanism of domestic political rule and control under the authority of
a tenno (or an emperor), not on the external behavior of the state in interna-
tional relations.
The Sino-centric world order was an established international system at the
eastern end of Eurasia for well over two thousand years. It vacillated between
unification and fragmentation, centralization and decentralization, and expan-
sion and contraction ; these cycles derived from China’s own dynamics and po-
litical order. The Sino-centric world order was concentric. At the middle was
China proper, populated by ethnic (Han) Chinese. On the periphery were
non-Han, barbarian tributary states. Some Chinese dynasties were ruled by
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II. The Traditional Japanese State Identity 
the Sino-centric World Order
Hans, others by non-Han foreigners. Two-thirds of the history of the Sino-
centric order are characterized by unification and centralization; the other third
by fragmentation and decentralization. The peripheral regions were continu-
ously subjected to these dynamics of expansion and contraction. During this
entire period, the use of force was endemic.
(３)
Certainly, Chinese dynasties varied in external aggressiveness according to
their comparative wealth and military power. But, when capable, they occa-
sionally annihilated barbarian states on the periphery that did not demonstrate
allegiance or submission. These dynamics are well explained by the real-
politik-dynastic cycle model. The model assumes that the decision-makers of
a dynastic state always seek to expand the capabilities of the state, on the
grounds that greater relative capabilities improve the state’s chance of survival
or at least enable power-maximization advantageous to creating conditions for
survival. As Alastair I. Johnston describes, the model predicts that,
as the empire consolidates and mobilizes in the earlier stages of the dy-
nastic cycle, it will adopt increasingly expansionist, coercive strategies (i.
e., extended campaigns beyond the frontiers, preventive colonization, for-
mal annexation of new territories, etc). . . . As the dynastic cycle peaks,
the empire is overextended financially and militarily. . . . As decline sets
in, the state turns to less offensively coercive, more static defensive
strategies, and from there to more accommodating strategies - peace trea-
ties, bribes, territorial concessions, etc. . . . In the final period of immi-
nent collapse, one might expect to see an increasing reliance on military
means－static defense of contracted frontiers－in a last-ditch fight for
survival.
(４)
The cyclical model stands up well against an alternate, development per-
spective. One may argue that each unified dynasty is stronger than its prede-
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cessor due to evolutionary internal growth and development. But such
changes never transformed the core nature of the Sino-centric system and its
cyclical dynamics. As a result, the last Chinese dynasty－the Qing－was far
weaker than Western imperialist powers in the 19th century that had survived
competition and war in the Western inter-state system.
The states in the peripheral regions, including the Japanese state, had been
exposed to the Sino-centric dynamics of unification and fragmentation that en-
tailed expansion and contraction. At the early stage of the dynastic cycle,
these states suffered from a strong dynastic expansionism involving grave se-
curity threats. They often were subject to aggression, invasion, occupation,
and annexation that imperiled their political survival. Conversely, in the de-
clining phase of the cycle, these states were less vulnerable to the Chinese dy-
nasties, which became increasingly defensive as their power waned. When a
dynasty collapsed and China proper was fragmented, the surrounding states
were essentially freed from serious security threats, although they occasion-
ally faced massive waves of refugees from China proper that jeopardized their
internal stability.
Unlike those states adjoining China proper and its contiguous territories,
the Japanese state had detached itself from the Sino-centric world order
thanks to its insularity and natural geographic barriers. The Japanese state had
never been incorporated into an integral part of the tributary-state system nor
subjected to its effective suzerainty. Certainly, Japan on several occasions
adopted short-lived and nominally tributary postures China for the
sake profit-making through trade. Yet the Japanese state, by and large, did not
belong to the Sino-centric order ; it was merely situated on its fringe.
Under the uninterrupted reign of a single monarchy throughout its history,
the Japanese retained a very strong sense of political independence 
the Sino-centric world order and even mobilized necessary armed forces for
defense against invasion from that world or in preparation for invasion. Al-
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though the Japanese efforts were crucial, the survival of the Japanese state
was made possible, arguably, by a combination of political factors including
concurrent resistance of other Asian states and ethnic forces on the peripheral
regions against expansionist Chinese dynasties.
The degree of unification and centralization of the Japanese state through
history shows a significant positive correlation with similar dynamics in the
Sino-centric world as did other states on the Chinese periphery. When Chi-
nese dynasties were secure and expansion-minded, the Japanese state came to
bear an acute sense of crisis and met the challenges from continental Asia by
centralizing political power and mobilizing military capabilities. During periods
of dynastic decline, on the other hand, China’s imperative to address threats
on its internal frontiers minimized its opportunities to engage in adventures on
its maritime frontiers. Always under the authority of a single monarchy, the
Japanese state in such times operated a very de-centralized political power
structure. This institutional characteristic was a result of the interplay of to-
pography and political culture : numerous semi-autonomous political communi-
ties were physically separated by mountains and rivers across the Japanese
archipelago, far away from the continent. In the ancient formative era, the ar-
chipelago remained politically fragmented since the Sino-centric world also un-
derwent protracted fragmentation.
Three events in Japan’s history around the time of these dynastic cycle
turning points
(５)
capture some critical attributes of the Japanese approach to the
Sino-centric world order. The first is Regent Prince 	exploration of
formal diplomatic relations with the Sui dynasty (581619 AD). , who
was pursuing Japanese independence and amour propre (self esteem), sent a
diplomatic message to a Sui emperor that claimed an equal and reciprocal bilat-
eral relationship. The second is the countrywide fortification of the Japanese
state in preparation of conceivably impending invasion by the combined armed
forces of the Tang dynasty (618907 AD) and the Silla monarchy (356935
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AD) situated on Korea, a military campaign that did not transpire.
(６)
The third
is the successful Japanese defeat under the feudal Kamakura shogunate, of two
Mongolian expeditions in 1274 and 1281 AD, followed by a protracted military
mobilization against anticipated invasions by the Mongolian Yuan dynasty
(12711368 AD). The extended sense of crisis helped the Kamakura
shogunate centralize its military command, despite its origins as a local polity
in the early Japanese medieval era, a period characterized by feudal interper-
sonal relationships and a decentralized political order.
The crisis passed, and the Yuan dynasty collapsed in the next century. The
Ming dynasty (13681644 AD), and later the Qing dynasty (16161911 AD)
inherited the multi-ethnic Yuan governance system of unification and centrali-
zation.
(７)
These dynasties were focused on, if not satisfied with, continental ex-
pansion. Therefore, they did not endanger the survival of the Japanese state.
During the Ming’s rise and fall, the Japanese state was largely fragmented and
occasionally unstable. In face of the Qing’s rise and expansion, the feudal
Tokugawa shogunate established implicit domestic hegemony. Although the
pre-modern Japanese state was united at the time of the Qing’s expansion, the
Tokugawa retained the de-centralized shogunate system, which was compara-
ble to pre-unification Germany in the 19th century. In sum, the way in which
the Japanese state changed over these periods reflects the rise and fall of these
Chinese two dynasties.
Based on this brief review one may draw several conclusions concerning the
traditional Japanese state identity. First of all, it evolved as a function of the
dynamics of the Sino-centric world order and crystallized into total rejection of
subjugation within that order. Second, Japan was the most successful East
Asian state in resisting the encroachment of external powers, which began
with the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century and continued in the 16th
century when Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and other Europeans attempted to
penetrate the region. The Japanese state was strong and competent enough to
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repel European political-military interventionists while utilizing the Euro-
peans’ knowledge, goods, and technologies, especially guns. Third, while the
traditional Japanese state identity is defined primarily in terms of its response
to Chinese power, the continued independence from the Sino-centric order so-
lidified its identity as the only unique state in the region with full political or-
thodoxy under the allegedly uninterrupted single succession line of the
imperial throne, in contrast to the numerous Chinese dynasties that had lost
any link with the legendary period long before the first Chinese dynasty. Con-
sequently, pre-modern Japan in 1867 had a state identity that was not only de-
tached from the Sino-centric order but also untouched by it. Aside from that
major feature, the state identity was essentially inward-looking.
With the advent of imperialism in East Asia, the Japanese state encountered
unfamiliar perils wielded by imperialist Western powers, which created an im-
minent sense of crisis in state survival. In addition, the Sino-centric world
order－upon which Japan had traditionally premised its own state identity－
began a serious decline in 1842, and would collapse altogether in 1895. To
confront these challenges, the Japanese state was compelled to centralize po-
litical power for achieving modernization and transformation and implementing
the strategy of attaining “rich nation, strong army.” Concurrently, the state
also was impelled to redefine its identity in a manner to enable its participation
as a full-fledged player in the global inter-state system that had originated with
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. This redefinition involved a radical shift from
the traditional Japanese state identity to an embodiment of a modern, Western
(initially, Westernized) state after the 1868 Meiji Restoration.
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III. Shifting Japanese State Identities
in Turbulence (18681945): From a Western Power
in Asia to a Non-Western, Revisionist Power
The debilitation and ensuing collapse of the Sino-centric order reinforced
Japan’s need for a renewed state identity. Already in decline, the Qing dynasty
suffered a miserable discomfiture at the hands of the British Empire in the
Opium War (18401842). Subsequently, major imperialist powers encroached
on the Qing’s Sino-centric order, extracting territorial and non-territorial con-
cessions. The Japanese state joined the predatory game as the last entrant, but
eventually reached for the lion’s share. The milestone was the Sino-Japanese
War (18941895) and the Treaty of Shimonoseki that delivered the final, fatal
blow to not only the Qing but also the Sino-centric order per se. The Yi mon-
archy in Korea, which constituted the last integral part of the tributary system,
was stripped from China’s orbit. Without any tributary states, the Sino-centric
order by definition simply ceased to exist.
(８)
With the breakdown of the Sino-centric system, the Japanese state began to
exercise its power and influence to transform the former Sino-centric world
into a peripheral part of the Western inter-state system. Hidehiro Okada pre-
sents a unique socio-political conceptualization of civilization that focuses on
what political order is deemed desirable. Seen from this approach, Japanese
civilization is starkly heterogeneous compared to Chinese civilization, given
that the former had been oriented to fragmentation and decentralization while
the latter had orientated itself to unification and centralization. Okada’s ap-
proach is in direct contrast to the more familiar socio-cultural conception of
civilization that is based on tradition, customs, manners, and languages as de-
fining characteristics. According to the socio-cultural model, Japanese culture,
although recognized as highly sophisticated and unique, is often considered as
a derivative of Chinese civilization. However, from Okada’s perspective, Chi-
nese civilization came into existence with the birth of the Sino-centric world
order through unification in 221 BC by Shi Huang-di of the Qin dynasty, and
ceased to exist after the 1895 crushing defeat of the Qing in the Sino-Japanese
war. Before the Qin, Chinese civilization simply did not exist. And since 1895,
(桃山法学 第12号 ’08)64
the traditional Chinese civilization has been extinguished, only to be replaced
with Chinese emulation of the Japanese variant of the Western civilization.
(９)
Most critical in this change was the Japanese impact on uprooting the tradi-
tional nucleus of the Sino-centric government system: mandarin bureaucracy
and traditional military. Okada emphasizes that the Chinese writing system
was pivotal in maintaining the integrity of the Chinese civilization and the
Sino-centric world order ; it was the sole common means of communication in
a civilization in which many diverse spoken dialects hindered smooth oral com-
munication. After 1895, China significantly transformed the traditional Chi-
nese language system and chose to introduce large new Japanese-made
vocabularies using Chinese characters that had crowded out traditional and lo-
cal vocabularies from social and natural sciences. Only by relying on these vo-
cabularies could China explore modernization and Westernization. As a result,
the Qing dynasty could not but abolish the traditional Chinese civil service ex-
amination system on the grounds that it only required thorough mastery of
Chinese classics and classical rhetoric, knowledge that had lost its utility. With
the modern Chinese language so metamorphosed, Chinese history lost its
uniqueness and was incorporated into a Japan-centered East Asia history as an
integral part of world history. Okada also stresses the comprehensive Japani-
zation of the post-1895 Qing army and the post-1912 early Republican army, in
which the core officer corps received extensive education and training at the
Imperial Japanese Army Academy.
From Okada’s perspective, no unique Chinese civilization has existed since
1895 ; instead the “Japanization” of China has continued with one period of in-
terruption (from the 1945 Japanese defeat in the Second World War to the
1978 normalization of Sino-Japanese relations). Okada emphasizes that the
Chinese identity since 1895 has been shaped by Japanese civilization, and that
the Chinese national consciousness has emerged in response to Japanization
pressures and resistance against these pressures.
(10)
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With its new identity as a Western power situated in East Asia, the Japanese
state strived in vain to manage the rapidly disintegrating political sphere that
used to be the Sino-centric world.
(11)
Japan, perhaps, was most vulnerable to this
disintegration due to its geographic proximity and new outward-looking iden-
tity : it had growing economic interests in the sphere such as trade, invest-
ment, an increasing number of Japanese residents there, and the growing
potential threat of massive refugee flows from China proper to Taiwan (a new
Japanese colony), and even the main archipelago, jeopardized internal stability.
Thus the Japanese state frequently interfered in the region’s internal politics
and even intervened militarily in the hope of controlling instability and disor-
der there.
(12)
Japan’s early unilateralist approach to managing regional instability
was exemplified by the Twenty-One Demands it presented to the fledgling
Chinese government in 1915.
In the 1920s, the Japanese state adopted a more multilateralist approach and
tried, futilely, to manage the peaking post-Qing instability and repercussions
by relying on the U. S.-led Washington Treaty system,
(13)
a cooperative arrange-
ment designed to create and maintain a regional order that would manage the
China question. All the parties agreed to respect the territorial integrity of
China and to carry out phased abolition of their imperialist or semi-colonial in-
terests and privileges there. Tokyo hoped that this system could serve as the
main pillar of Japan’s foreign and security policy, in place of the recently abro-
gated Anglo-Japan alliance. This new multilateral approach blocked Tokyo
from taking unilateral measures to preserve its interests and privileges in
China.
But the imagined new regional order existed only on paper, and the situation
continued to worsen for several decades, until the People’s Republic of China
was established in 1949. The U. S. administrations after the First World War
were increasingly susceptible to prevailing pacifist and anti-imperialist public
sentiment. The United States had few interests at stake in East Asia and
(桃山法学 第12号 ’08)66
lacked a consistent strategic approach to the China question. These realities
seriously constrained the U. S. political leadership as well as the diplomatic es-
tablishment. As a result, Washington undertook frequent verbal interferences,
but never threatened the use of force to preserve the Washington Treaty
system.
(14)
A concert of great powers in East Asia never materialized.
Having failed to secure its vital security interests through the Washington
Treaty system, the Japanese state gradually broke away from the system and
reluctantly marched on an independent, revisionist path that challenged the
Western imperialist order and eventuated in a showdown with the established
great powers, particularly the United States. Tokyo initially sought the estab-
lishment of a Japan-centered open East Asian economic order coexistent with
the Western inter-state system. Toshikazu Inoue depicts how Tokyo explored
such an open regional economic order in the 1930s when exclusive economic
blocs had spread world-wide. In this period, the United States continued to
be China’s biggest trade partner, even during the protracted armed conflict
between Japan and China in which Tokyo relied on trade with the United
States to finance the arms imports essential for the continued fighting of the
conflict.
(15)
In other words, Washington’s active engagement was indispensable.
Increasingly isolated, however, Tokyo finally concluded that the Western
inter-state system was essentially unjust due to imperialism, colonialism, and
racism. Japan therefore attempted in vain to build a Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere under its aegis, which ended in total war with the United
States and national annihilation.
A leading ideologue of the period, Shumei Ohkawa, offered a rationalization
for this shift in Japanese policy and a definition of the resultant state identity.
Ohkawa understood that the U. S. open door policy essentially demanded U. S.
participation in the reallocation of colonial interests in China,
(16)
with its focus on
other imperialist powers’ extraterritoriality, customs receivership, and conces-
sions including railways and other related possessions. His understanding was
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in fact warranted, at least from a then-prevailing Japanese perspective, given
the evolution of the China question in U. S.-Japan relations－from John Hay’s
open door notes in 1899 and 1900 to the Katsura-Harriman memorandum in
1905 to the IshiiLansing agreement in 1917 to President Wilson’s disapproval
of special Japanese interests in China. Ohkawa considered the Japanese state
to be the sole Asian leader at that time, which justified temporary Japanese
forceful re-colonization of Western colonies and semi-colonies in East Asia, in-
cluding China, as necessary for their subsequent political independence. How-
ever, this approach was based on an apparently contradictory combination of
Asian solidarity and Japanese exceptionalism. He also defended Japan’s war
against the United States on the grounds that hegemonic U. S. policy had re-
jected Japan’s vital interests, particularly its legitimate vested interests in
China, and that Japan would be forced to be a U. S. protectorate or a semi-
colony if it continuously compromised with the United States without fighting
back. In sum, Ohkawa’s ideology was constructed on the pre-1945 Japanese
state identity, a non-Western revisionist power－an identity aimed to decon-
struct, not to reverse, the Western colonial relationship of the ruling and the
ruled.
(17)
Grounded upon the above compendious analysis, one may gather that
Tokyo’s quest for an open regional order collapsed not because Japan failed to
effectively challenge Washington for regional hegemony but because it failed
to anchor Washington to East Asia, particularly with respect to Sino-Japanese
relations.
During the turbulence of 18681945, the Japanese state underwent a major
identity shift from being a Western power situated in East Asia to a non-
Western power that led East Asia to reject the Western inter-state system. It
should be noted that Tokyo preferred the former state identity and chose the
latter only when it came to believe that it had no other options.
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Since the 1945 defeat and subsequent occupation primarily by the United
States, the Japanese state identity has been so internally conflicted that Tokyo
has never regained the great-power status essential to participate in the man-
agement of the power structure of the Western inter-state system, instead re-
signing itself to a probationary status devoid of any independent foreign and
security policy. New international conditions temporarily freed Japan from the
traditional dynamics of its state identity formation. At the international level,
it was the Soviet Union－not China－that posed a serious existential threat to
Japan. Post-1949 China did not pose a threat due to its domestic instability and
exclusively internal orientation, as symbolized by the failed Great Leap For-
ward (195862) and the Cultural Revolution (196676). At the domestic
level, a U. S.-drafted pacifist constitution, stipulating the renunciation of war in
principle and the right of belligerency in particular, was imposed upon the
Japanese state.
Tokyo has been unable to amend its constitution due to both the procedural
impediments built into the constitution, and to persistently bipolarized public
opinion on foreign and security policy that contemporaneously aspires to
great-power autonomy and to pacifism.
(18)
Similarly, Japan faced competing state
identities during the Cold War and it could not fully adopt either one. The bi-
polar international system deprived Japan of both a great power’s freedom of
international action and the neutrality essential for genuine pacifism; it could
neither participate as an independent nation within the system nor opt out of
the system in defiance against the United States and the Soviet Union. The
ambiguity of Japan’s state identity made it impossible for the Japanese state to
recapture the integrity of historical outlook and value-system of a great-power
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IV. Competing Japanese State Identities
during the Cold War and Their Legacies
that is a prerequisite to articulating foreign and security policy and for exercis-
ing unilateral use of military power, if necessary.
Rather, Tokyo accepted U. S. hegemony, and became the junior partner in
a bilateral alliance. It therefore possessed modest armed forces in size, al-
though it has progressively been equipped with high-tech weaponry that is ei-
ther U. S.-produced, U. S.-licensed, or U. S.-derived. In order to not challenge
U. S. predominance, Tokyo has restrained itself from acquiring major power
projection capabilities, to say nothing of nuclear weapons. During the Cold
War, the Japanese state was arguably a U. S. protectorate ; it was a civilian
power but not a conventional great military power. Tokyo accepted this role
in the U. S.-dominated Western inter-state system and has exploited the sys-
tem to the maximum to attain Japan’s reconstruction and development, a vital
national interest defined primarily in economic terms. Indeed, Japan peacefully
resurged as a great civilian power possessing economic and technological
prowess that is arguably second only to the United States. This limited role
precluded a negative spiral of arms races in East Asia, but the resulting eco-
nomic strength creates long-term political implications for military capability
and potential.
Currently, however, the Japanese state is an economic giant but remains a
political dwarf. Even though it has attained the potential to be a great power,
Tokyo has in fact pursed a niche-diplomacy typical of a middle-power and con-
sistent with the bilateral alliance with the United States.
(19)
It has declared its in-
tention to pursue a U.N.-centered, Asian-oriented, autonomous approach with
Japan playing the role of an “economic great power.” Within this role, Tokyo
has adroitly exploited the common and divergent interests of great powers to
make its foreign policy more proactive and autonomous. In the 1970s, for ex-
ample, Japan took advantage of the international context－which included the
Sino-Soviet split, Soviet-U. S. , and Sino-U. S. rapprochement－to nor-
malize relations with China, develop an entente with South Korea, and,
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achieve rapprochement with Southeast Asian countries. When it practices this
kind of veiled niche-diplomacy, Tokyo only reinforces the seriously bipolarized
nature of domestic public opinion about Japan’s state identity.
Domestic controversy further intensified in the 1980s when Washington
pressed Tokyo to undertake a much higher level of economic and military bur-
den-sharing to buttress the then-economically weakened U. S. hegemony un-
der which the Japanese state prospered. Tokyo would appear to lose
autonomy if it simply paid the U. S. “levy,” and to contravene the pacifist con-
stitution if it readily fought hand in hand with the United States, or exercised
the right of collective self-defense. Japanese politicians and thinkers promoted
two diametrically opposed concepts of state identity to justify a new activism:
the Japanese state as a “global civilian power” and as a “normal state.” A lead-
ing Japanese liberal journalist, Yoichi Funabashi, argued that Japan should be
a global civilian power focused exclusively on non-military civilian contribu-
tions to international society without becoming a conventional great power.
Funabashi did not envision Japan as a conventional great power, and disagreed
with any use of military instruments, including active participation in U.N.
peace-keeping and /or peace-enforcement operation.
(20)
On the other hand, con-
servative Japanese political leader Ichiro Ozawa insisted that Japan must be a
“normal state” that resolutely takes part in such U.N. operations, while distin-
guishing the concept from a conventional great power by refusing to exercise
the right of collective self-defense and only endorsing those military opera-
tions under the aegis of the United Nations.
(21)
Due to the effects of the persistent internal conflict in terms of state iden-
tity,
(22)
Tokyo has been obliged to contain itself to the discourse based on pacifist
tenets and doctrines on foreign and security policy. Tokyo’s decision-makers
and policy intellectuals employ pacifist symbols and symbolic strategies in or-
der to secure legitimacy and portray a sense of competency. The self-
contained pacifist discourse occurs on the symbolic and rhetorical levels, but
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is divorced from the world of policy challenges and policy choices. Yet the
pacifist discourse is vulnerable to a protracted sense of crisis engendered by
imminent threat perceptions, and will ultimately break down if overwhelming
realities and challenges impose themselves on the state. In sum, the durability
of the self-contained pacifist discourse in Japan is a function of the international
security environment. This arrangement was very stable during the Cold War
period and for a while after, when it was understood that the United States
would bear Japan’s security burden. But now the Japanese state faces new
global and regional security challenges.
After the September 11, 2001, attack against the United States, Japan ex-
tended meaningful military support to the U. S. global war on terrorism and
U. S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, primarily in the form of
Japan’s Self Defense Force’s logistical and rear-area support and humanitarian
assistance, which fall short of exercising the right of collective self-defense.
Over the last decade, Japan has been exposed to a growing threat from North
Korea and its rudimentary nuclear weapons capability, as demonstrated by
Pyongyang’s diplomatic brinksmanship, a series of ballistic missile tests, and
a nuclear explosion test in October 2006. Furthermore, Japan faces a growing
potential threat from China due to its rapid, non-transparent military buildup
and modernization, as well as the Chinese navy’s submarine intrusion into
Japanese territorial waters, the Chinese navy’s extensive underwater explora-
tion in Japanese exclusive economic zones, anti-satellite weapon tests, and
continued increase of ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan.
Under lingering pacifist premises, Tokyo remains subject to the existing
pacifist legal and constitutional arrangements that prohibit it from exercising
the right of collective self-defense with the United States. Increasingly, these
overly pacifist obligations have straitjacketed Japan’s foreign and security pol-
icy. Tokyo has already reached to the outer limits of legal maneuvering in fa-
vor of the United States, the author of the pacifist constitution which now
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favors a more robust Japanese role in regional and global security. Nudged by
Washington,
(23)
Tokyo has seriously explored avenues for constitutional amend-
ment.
(24)
Tokyo also has loosened two self-imposed policy restrictions that are non-
legal corollaries of the pacifist legal arrangements : the exceedingly strict
Three Principles of Arms Export was modified in a way to permit U. S. access
to Japanese military technologies and products, and the rigid Diet resolution
on the peaceful use of outer space was revised in a manner to endorse the ac-
quisition and deployment of state-of-the-art military surveillance and intelli-
gence satellites.
(25)
In addition, the Koizumi administration (200106) achieved
unusually swift and extensive passage of sweeping extensive security-related
legislation and dispatched Japan’s armed forces to the Indian Ocean and Iraq to
support the U. S. global war on terrorism. Most critical is the rapidly deepen-
ing integration of the U. S. and Japanese command and control systems, driven
by the development of parallel theater missile defense systems in which the
two militaries share and exchange real-time electronic data. As a result, the
integration is increasingly blurring the line where collective self-defense starts
and ends.
Based on the above analysis, one might conclude that through the Cold War
and the post-Cold War periods, the Japanese state identity has been a function
of U. S. hegemony, lacking consistency, integrity, and unity. Owing to such a
dysfunctional integration of the state identity, Japan has so far been ensnared
in an excessively bipolarized debate, featuring bipolarized polemics from auto-
nomy-oriented and pacifism-oriented approaches and their multiple derivatives
and hybrids. Roles such as Gaullist great power, semi-neorealist “normal
state,” mercantilist global economic power, multilateralist middle power, and
internationalist global civilian power have been fought over by various combat-
ants in the battle to define Japan’s state identity.
This battle is reaching a crucial stage, and the Japanese state is entering a
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self-redefining moment. It remains fettered by its historical legacy－its inter-
nally conflicted identity in general and its self-contained pacifist discourse in
particular. These fetters, however, may break abruptly if the state should con-
front an acute security shock, or may unexpectedly fall apart if the state should
face a chronic security peril. It is impossible to predict when such a transfor-
mation may occur, and what a renewed state identity would be like. Yet, one
can derive an exhaustive list of Japan’s geo-strategic options, based upon the
Japanese macro-historical geo-strategic experience, and rank them in order of
preference.
V. The Rise of China and Japan’s Strategic Options
1. Two independent variables of regional order : Japan’s response to
U. S. power and U. S. strategic orientation versus Japan’s response
to China’s power and China’s strategic orientation
Japanese macro-historical geo-strategic experience suggests two independ-
ent sources for determining Japan’s geo-strategic behavior : China and the
United States. To be more specific, the two axes of determining Japan’s behav-
ior are (1) Japan’s response to U. S. power and its strategic orientation and
(2) Japan’s response to China’s power and its strategic orientation. These two
factors shape the regional power structure and hence Japan’s geo-strategic cal-
culations as the basis of its geo-strategic choice and behavior. This compre-
hensive approach is in sharp contrast to a comparative foreign / security policy
analysis focusing on a single country, as exemplified by a recent article by
Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” published in The Washing-
ton Quarterly in autumn 2006.
(26)
In his study, Samuels examines the post-war
evolution of Japan’s security strategy, tracing major contemporary discussions
of Japan’s strategic options among Japanese policy and intellectual circles.
Then he concludes that Japan will most likely take a comprehensive risk-
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hedging strategy while retaining major features of the current mainstream
strategic thinking: light armament and bilateral alliance with the United States.
He states :
Japan’s repositioning will not be linear. A new consensus will depend on
the selection and construction of a national identity, whether Japan comes
to see itself as a great or middle power and whether it will define its role
in regional or global terms. It will depend also on shifting balances of
power, particularly between China and the United States. Above all, it
will depend on the way Tokyo opts to balance its need to hedge risk
against its chance to optimize for gain. Japan may never again be as cen-
tral to world affairs as it was in the 1930s nor as marginal to world affairs
as it was during the Cold War, but once revisionism has run its course and
once necessary accommodations are made in its economic diplomacy, Ja-
pan will have constructed for itself a post-Yoshida policy space in which
it can be selectively pivotal. . . . It will be normal. It will hedge. . . . Japan
will be neither too close to China nor too far from the United States.
(27)
But Samuels’ elegant analysis is only a partial success on the grounds that
his two independent variables are (1) Japan’s response to U. S. power and its
strategic orientation and (2) Japanese willingness to use military power. As a
result, Samuels takes the stability of U. S. hegemony as a given, while Japan’s
response to China’s power and its strategic orientation is not evaluated as an
independent variable. His selection of variables leads to a static analysis that
captures some major characteristics of the ongoing policy discourse in Japan,
driven by the bipolar dilemma of great-power autonomy versus pacifism. His
analysis presumes that the discourse, if it takes place under a skilled leader-
ship, will reach a viable consensus through a gradual fine-tuning process. His
approach assumes no swift, drastic changes in the regional security environ-
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ment that would pose serious threats to Japan. The assumption that takes the
security environment as a constant may or may not hold. However, Samuels
presumes that Japan’s niche-diplomacy, typical of a middle power, is unshak-
able or least at least highly durable, given that the so-called Yoshida doctrine
has been so firmly institutionalized.
In addition, “Japanese willingness to use military power,” is not a proper in-
dependent variable but instead must be treated either as a dummy variable for
Japan’s security environment or a variable serially correlated over time with a
number of factors such as Japan’s wealth and technological power. In Samuel’s
reasoning, for instance, it is impossible to specify why the Japanese state has
followed a mercantilist approach. The state may do so to obtain purely eco-
nomic gains or to build political leadership via economic and related soft-power
measures or to beef up its economic power in pursuit of military power. In this
regard, Samuels’ approach is insufficient to characterize the nature of a poten-
tial East Asian Community to be developed, either as a community based on
a common identity or an economically integrated system with a single cur-
rency unit or a tightly interwoven network of production and distribution.
Conversely, Samuels’ approach fails to offer a dynamic analysis that captures
possible patterns of the regional power-structure, such as U. S.-centered,
China-centered, Japan-centered, bipolar, or multi-polar. Nor does his static
analysis explain under what conditions Japan will continue or abandon its stra-
tegic dependence on the U. S.Japan alliance. Nor does his analysis take into
account of the potentially dynamic levels of constraints on Japan’s strategic de-
pendence that may bring about a dramatic shift of Japan’s geo-strategic behav-
ior. Japan’s distancing from (or embracing of) the United States is not the sole
determinant of its strategy. On the contrary, Japan’s strategy is defined by a
combination of its assessments of the roles to be played independently by the
United States and China. What Japan does with respect to China is not just the
opposite of its approach to the United States, as Samuels implies. He takes the
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post-1945 status quo for granted, without considering the changing patterns of
regional security order before and after the advent of Western powers in East
Asia. Samuels’ static analysis may be included as a special case within the dy-
namic macro-historical geo-strategic analysis explored in this study, reaching
a similar conclusion under his specific set of geo-strategic conditions.
Samuels may have settled on this framework because he uses the two di-
chotomies of great power middle power and a nuclear, independent Ja-
pan a non-nuclear Japan under the U. S. nuclear umbrella. In light of
various indicators, such as GNP, population size, and strategic depth, Japan
cannot rival other great powers, but it surpasses middle powers. It stands
somewhere between a middle power and a great power. Thus, reflecting
solely on these internal structural indicators will not enable Japan to determine
its state identity and, in turn, influence its geo-strategic choices. Instead, in
the reverse, Japan’s decision on its military-strategic role as well as its devel-
opment of military power to fulfill such a role will determine its state identity
－a great-power or otherwise.
At this juncture, it is critically important to examine the possibility that Ja-
pan will continue to hold such an in-between status and develop a small nu-
clear arsenal. In fact, the nuclear armament issue is already under active
debate in Japanese political, policy, and intellectual circles, due to the recent
North Korean missile tests and the October 2006 nuclear test ; this debate ex-
ists despite the taboo in post-war, pacifist Japan and the current absence of the
issue from the official government agenda. The growing potential threat from
China, especially the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal, has occasion-
ally intensified the debate. If the U. S. nuclear umbrella should be found po-
rous, and hence ineffectual in deterring China from attacking Japan with
conventional weaponry, the Japanese state may choose limited nuclearization
just as the United Kingdom and Israel have done in a way that does not chal-
lenge U. S. nuclear supremacy at the strategic level.
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The following analysis will investigate the possible future power structures
in East Asia, with the focus on U. S. power relative to China, and will explore
Japan’s geo-strategic options and policy choices for each possible structure.
2. Logical and Practical Possibilities
Japan’s strategic approach to the United States will vary according to U. S.
power and strategic orientation : political-military predominance (strong he-
gemony), dominance (weak hegemony), or loss of hegemony. Similarly,
Japan’s response to China will vary in accordance with China’s power and its
strategic orientation : a strong revisionist power, a resilient status quo power,
or a debilitated internally-oriented power. The two sets of variables will make
up a three-by-three matrix.
However, the following analysis will not consider the scenario in which
China is debilitated and internally-oriented. This scenario is unlikely for the
foreseeable future, due to China’s continuing robust economic growth. Given
serious socio-economic bottlenecks for growth and development, however,
there is growing potential for domestic social unrest and instability.
(28)
Neither will the current study focus on a scenario in which China is a resil-
ient status quo power. Theoretically, this scenario suggests that China may be
somehow satisfied with the international and regional status quo and remain
resilient even under the Communist dictatorship, opting to pursue a concert of
power with the United States and Japan. In this rosy scenario, China would
play a secondary role in conjunction with Japan and a strong, hegemonic
United States. If the United States were to decline in power or to lose its he-
gemony outright, China would still strive to maintain the extant norms and
rules of the liberal democratic international order while sharing international
and regional leadership roles in concert with Japan and a debilitated United
States.
The above scenario is improbable because history shows that a rapidly ris-
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ing power tends to challenge a dominant power in international power
transitions,
(29)
and because a democratizing authoritarian state is prone to taking
a revisionist external policy by manipulating nationalist sentiments at home,
thereby diverting growing popular discontent with its authoritarian rule to
such an external policy.
(30)
Certainly, as Alastair I. Johnston discusses,
(31)
some current facts suggest
China’s potential to be an accommodationist power, rather than a revisionist
power. However, such an assessment of China’s strategic intentions at the
present does not at all preclude the widely-accepted relevancy of a U. S.Japan
hedging strategy China given uncertainty as to China’s future inten-
tions and capabilities. Johnston follows a micro-level sociological approach to
a negative spiral of interactive threat perceptions among the United States, Ja-
pan, and China, which he warns would transform an undecided China into a
committed foe. Johnson’s rationalist, a-historical and static analysis also cau-
tions against relying unduly on historical analogies or the worst case scenario
(China’s pursuit of a revived Sino-centric order).
The Japanese macro-historical geo-strategic experience has demonstrated
that Johnston’s worst case scenario is in fact a reasonably worrisome possibil-
ity, if not a probability : a macro-historical dynamic is more than a historical
analogy. This is because the dynamic is embedded in a durable configuration
of various factors, including China’s geography, topography, ethnic composi-
tion, and the political culture that involves its approaches to the outside world,
particularly to the peripheral regions. Seen from this perspective, as long as
a similar configuration of factors exists, China will have a strong propensity to
repeat or at least try to repeat the behavioral pattern. The macro-historical ap-
proach in this study is thus dynamic and non-rationalist (or historicist) with
regard to the understanding of historical dynamics as the initial condition.
Based on a macro-historical perspective, this study will employ a realist calcu-
lation in that context.
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For practical purposes, therefore, the following analysis will concentrate on
the combination of a strong revisionist China with the three scenarios of U. S.
power and its strategic orientation. Accordingly, as Table 1 : Japan’s Strategic
Options shows, this study will use two independent variables : (1) Japan’s re-
sponse to the future of U. S. hegemony in East Asia and (2) Japan’s response
to China’s rise. To make the discussion analytical, the first variable is divided
into three stages : strong hegemony, weakened hegemony and loss of hegem-
ony. When the United States retains hegemony, either strong or weakened,
Japan is assumed to bandwagon with a hegemonic United States and to choose
continuation of the U. S.Japan alliance with different degrees of freedom of its
external action, rather than to challenge the hegemon. Conversely, if the
United States loses hegemony, Japan is expected to abrogate the alliance.
The second variable is broken down into two choices for Japan : (1) distanc-
ing from a strong China which includes options to resist or prepare for resist-
ing China and (2) embracing a strong China.
Table 1 consists of three columns multiplied by two rows. These combina-
tions are :
(桃山法学 第12号 ’08)80
Table 1 : Japan’s Strategic Options
Japan’s
Response
to China
Japan’s
Response
to the
U. S.
Continuing the U. S.Japan Alliance
Hegemony Weakened Hegemony
Abrogating
the U. S.-Japan
Alliance
Loss of Hegemony
Distancing from
a strong China
A
(second choice)
C
(third choice)
E
( first choice)
Embracing
a strong China
B D
(	)
F
( fifth choice)
(A) bandwagoning with a strong U. S. hegemon by continuing the U. S.
Japan alliance and distancing from a strong China ;
(B) bandwagoning with a strong U. S. hegemon and embracing a strong
China ;
(C) bandwagoning with a weakened U. S. hegemon by continuing the
U. S.Japan alliance and distancing from a strong China ;
(D) bandwagoning with a weakened U. S. hegemon by continuing the
U. S.Japan alliance and embracing a strong China ;
(E) breaking from a former U. S. hegemon by abrogating the U. S.Japan
alliance and distancing from a strong China ;
(F) breaking from a former U. S. hegemon by abrogating the U. S.Japan
alliance and embracing a strong China.
The following analysis elucidates each of the six possible power relation-
ships between the United States, China, and Japan, and elaborates on feasible
geo-strategic options for Japan, adducing some major historical precedents of
its “balancing” and “bandwagoning” the United States and China and
the ongoing discourse on those options now held in Japan.
3. Japan’s Five Options
Option A: Continuing the U. S.Japan alliance under strong U. S. hegemony,
and distancing from a strong China
The first power relationship involves Japan’s full bandwagoning with the
United States and strong balancing against China. In such a relationship, Japan
would be severely subjected to U. S. hegemonic policy against China in not
only foreign and security policy but also economic policy, and would have little
freedom of geo-strategic action while enjoying U. S. security protection from
Chinese threats. In this environment, the United States would be predominant
and, therefore, possess both the ability and willingness to effectively meet any
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Chinese challenge. Japan would not be allowed to have any independent mili-
tary capabilities of a magnitude that could challenge U. S. military supremacy,
such as nuclear weapons and major power projection capabilities, and instead
would carry out its own limited military buildup in response to U. S. pressure
or with U. S. consent. Even former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982
87), known as one of the most conservative nationalists, consistently advo-
cated a Japan with significant conventional military capabilities, evidently mod-
eled after the United Kingdom or France, yet without any nuclear arsenals. In
essence, the United States would only permit Japan to play a supplementary
role in logistical and rear-area supports, not a complementary role in major
combat operations. The notable exception in the Cold War period was Japan’s
anti-submarine warfare capabilities to complement U. S. roles.
The first power relationship is comparable to the U. S.Japan alliance 
the Soviet Union, and Japan’s strategic options would be similar to those
available during the Cold War period, because the self-contained pacifist dis-
course in Japan would most likely continue to weigh ponderously on discus-
sions about state identity. Tokyo would continue to pursue typical middle
power niche-diplomacy consistent with U. S. hegemony, while striving to en-
hance its economic and technological power and thereby military potential.
Tokyo would be less interested in becoming an active military power, and in-
stead might be satisfied to develop into Ozawa’s “normal state” by expanding
its security role in humanitarian, peace-keeping, and possibly peace-
enforcement operations, particularly those under the aegis of the United Na-
tions.
Under this power structure, an East Asian Community must be a regional
subsystem of the U. S. hegemonic system and, therefore, must include the
United States as de facto leading member state, despite its outsider status ; Ja-
pan would play only a secondary leadership role, serving as the hub to other
U. S. regional allies. A corollary of such a community is a Free Trade Agree-
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ment of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) that Washington has promoted through the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The community would be an
economic expression of the U. S. regional security mechanism, serving to en-
gage and, if necessary, contain China’s economic power. This is because China
remains undemocratic under a communist dictatorship and does not share
common values, such as freedom, democracy, and free market, on which all of
East Asia could build a genuine regional community comparable to the Euro-
pean Union.
The protracted military counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghani-
stan have weakened U. S. hegemony, perhaps significantly, due to the substan-
tial expenditures on the conflicts and domestic public opinion that is increas-
ingly anti-war. Concurrently, the United States has gradually experienced
substantial relative economic decline the expanding European Union
(with the Euro as a key alternative currency) and the newly emerging Brazil-
ian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese (BRIC) economies. The first power rela-
tionship is a strategic environment congenial to the self-contained pacifist
discourse but, as current trends indicate, is an unlikely scenario even though
revitalization of U. S. hegemony may not be impossible over the long term.
Option B: Continuing the alliance under strong U. S. hegemony, and embrac-
ing a strong China.
This combination is in fact not an option, as it implies that Japan would be
under a Sino-American condominium. Given that the existing U. S.Japan alli-
ance is integral to the U. S. hegemonic system, such a situation is not practical.
A strong U. S. hegemony precludes Japan’s embrace of a strong China that may
challenge the U. S. hegemony. Japan possesses geo-strategic value too great
for the United States to relinquish. China’s challenge to U. S. hegemony would
be formidable if it could utilize Japan’s economic, industrial, technological, and
limited but significant military capabilities as well as military bases and
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facilities. This judgment is reinforced by the fact that the U. S.Japan alliance
is based on values of freedom and democracy while China remains undemo-
cratic under a communist regime.
Option C: Continuing the alliance under weakened U. S. hegemony, and dis-
tancing from a strong China
The second possible power relationship entails Japan’s full bandwagoning
with a weaker United States－primarily in security policy－and strong balanc-
ing against China. Under this scenario, Japan must support the U. S. hegem-
ony without challenging U. S. military predominance on the grounds that the
United States would be fully willing yet only marginally able to effectively
meet China’s challenges. In this relationship, therefore, Japan would be able to
perform its own significant military buildup in response to U. S. pressure or
with U. S. consent, and to enjoy a noticeably higher level of freedom of action
in foreign, security and economic policies. More specifically, the United States
would press Japan to acquire limited power projection capabilities and, as the
U. S. hegemony underwent further relative decline, to develop significant pro-
jection capabilities such as surgical strike capabilities and aircraft carriers as
well as strategic air- and sea-lift capabilities. In essence, the United States
would demand or accept Japan playing a major complementary role in peace-
time as well as supplementary role in combat operations, in addition to a major
supplementary role in logistical and rear-area support.
Particularly noteworthy would be the changing prospects for Japan’s nuclear
armament under the condition of U. S. hegemonic decline. Japan must not pos-
sess strategic nuclear arsenals that would challenge U. S. nuclear superiority
so long as Japan bandwagons with the United States and relies on the U. S. nu-
clear umbrella. Tokyo could choose limited nuclear armament as the United
Kingdom and Israel have done. Such a strategic choice could entail the produc-
tion and development of 100200 tactical nuclear warheads loaded on cruse
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missiles that can be launched from platforms such as submarines, major sur-
face vessels, and long-range aircraft. If the U. S. hegemony were ever seri-
ously debilitated, Japan might be forced to develop a limited strategic nuclear
arsenal of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Surprisingly
enough, even former prime minister Nakasone, once an unflinching proponent
of a non-nuclear Japan, now emphasizes the need to study Japan’s nuclear op-
tions in case the state should face sudden abrogation of the U. S.Japan alliance
and loss of the U. S. nuclear umbrella.
(32)
The second power relationship has already unfolded to some extent, as dem-
onstrated by Japan’s post 911 approach to the U. S.Japan alliance, which in-
cludes Japanese overseas military operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq.
This changed relationship will seriously shake the self-contained pacifist dis-
course in a way that enables Tokyo to exercise the right of collective self-
defense with the United States through modification of overly pacifist Japanese
legal arrangements and, probably, constitutional amendments. The relation-
ship will drive Tokyo to depart from the established de facto niche-diplomacy
typical of a middle power toward conventional great-power behavior, while
translating its economic and technological power into military capability. Thus
Tokyo would become increasingly interested in being militarily active and less
inclined to confine itself to Ozawa’s “normal state” which focuses on non-
combat missions and combat operations under the U.N. aegis. Yet as long as
Tokyo could bandwagon with a hegemonic United States, Japan would be very
cautious about going nuclear. In sum, Japan’s nuclearization is a function of
U. S. hegemonic decline that may range from a moderate decline to a serious
debilitation.
Under this power structure, an East Asian Community could be a Japan-
centered regional economic association that remains interdependent with the
U. S. economy and anchored with the U. S. military hegemon. Hitoshi Tanaka,
Japan’s former vice-minister of foreign affairs (200205) once a leading gov-
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ernment strategist, proposes an East Asian Community which includes not
only the ASEAN+3 (the ASEAN member states, China, South Korea and Ja-
pan) but also India, Australia and New Zealand. The latter three states would
be essential to contain China, since they would supplement the military, politi-
cal, and economic power of the U. S.Japan alliance amid declining U. S. he-
gemony. With such an expanded community, Tanaka veils his strategic goals
to contain China, force the country to accept Western common values, particu-
larly freedom and democracy, and eventually create a Japan-centered East
Asian Community that observes Western values and rules.
(33)
In the 2006
ASEAN economic ministerial meeting, Toshihiro Nikai, then-Japanese Minis-
ter of Economics, Trade and Industry, announced his strong support for an
East Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) based on the above expanded vi-
sion of a regional institution.
This approach is characterized by open regionalism. The United States, al-
though an outsider, would be welcome to play an active role, and China would
be included as a major member state, yet without having any strong leadership
role. At its core, this strategic choice is very similar to Japan’s futile attempt
in the 1930s to achieve open regionalism with a strong U. S. engagement in the
region.
(34)
Option D: Continuing the alliance under weakened U. S. hegemony, and em-
bracing a strong China
The third power relationship is characterized by Japan’s full bandwagoning
with the United States primarily for security reasons and partial bandwagoning
with China in diplomatic and economic issue-areas. In this relationship, Japan
must form an entente with China that is consistent with the U. S.Japan alli-
ance. This strategic option is inevitable if Japan should be unwilling and /or un-
able, while relying on U. S. security protection that would become increasingly
unreliable due to a U. S. hegemonic decline, to increase its military power to
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a level adequate for defense against China. Then Japan would be compelled to
appease China on many specific diplomatic and economic issues, on the
grounds that the United States would be only interested to buttress the funda-
mental security framework ; Japan’s specific diplomatic and economic interests
would not necessarily overlap those of the United States. Logically, this trilat-
eral power relationship may evolve into an integral part of a global and /or re-
gional concert of power. However, as long as China continues to seek the
revival of a Sino-centric order, its competitive psychology will preclude this
scenario.
The Sino-Japanese entente would most likely result from the interplay of
Japan’s fiscal inability to engage in an arms race and its staunch, self-contained
pacifist discourse. Should the U. S. hegemony undergo a serious decline, in
parallel with worsening budgetary deficits and rapid demographic changes in
Japan, Tokyo might become reluctant to fill the regional power vacuum,
thereby reinforcing the self-contained pacifist discourse. Then Tokyo would
be less interested to be an active military power to meet China’s challenge and
instead choose to enter into an entente with China.
Under this power structure, an East Asian Community would be a China-
centered regional economic association in which China plays the leadership
role and shapes the regional geo-economic landscape through agenda-setting,
rule-making, and business transactions. Beijing has already pursued a corol-
lary of such a community, an East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) that
consists of the ASEAN+3 countries, but excludes India, Australia, and New
Zealand. Certainly, Japan would continue to have the largest or second largest
(after China) national economy and to function as the chief provider of capital
and technology for the Community, and as a major trade partner. Yet, with this
arrangement, Japan would be unable to exercise the primary leadership role
and instead would suffer from geo-economic marginalization. Practically, this
strategic option would be a likely product of Beijing’s current approach to
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regional community building.
Option E: Abrogating the alliance as a result of the end of U. S. hegemony, and
distancing from a strong China
The fourth power relationship involves Japan’s full balancing against both
the United States and China. This relationship would require a full military
buildup, including full nuclear armament across strategic and tactical levels and
possession of major power projection capabilities that are commensurate with
other great powers, making Japan a pole in world politics. The transformation
would become feasible only after a tectonic power shift in the region disinte-
grates the self-contained pacifist discourse in Japan and, as a result, Tokyo be-
comes prepared to finance the extensive arms buildup. The sea-change also
assumes that a post-hegemony United States, still possessing significant mili-
tary power, would maintain off-shore balancingJapan as well as China,
and would not form a Sino-U. S. alliance against Japan. In other words, it would
be essential for Tokyo to ensure that Washington would be willing to coexist
with Japan and China as equals in a great-power game, perhaps even leading
to a concert among them.
Under this power structure, an East Asian Community simply cannot exist,
but the contemporary version of a Japan-centric East Asian Community will
come into being, composed of maritime, coastal, and peninsular states in East
and Southeast Asia minus China. Yet, the Community would hardly be
autarkic as that of the 1930s suggests and, therefore, would not be viable with-
out an open economic environment for trade, investment, and finance amid the
geo-strategic estrangement between the United States, China, and Japan. The
constraint would be all the more robust under the growing economic inter-
dependence that characterizes contemporary economic relations.
Option F : Abrogating the alliance as a result of the end of U. S. hegemony, and
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embracing a strong China
The fifth power relationship entails Japan’s full bandwagoning with China
and full balancing against the United States. In this relationship, Japan would
be unable to depend on U. S. protectionChina, including the U. S. nu-
clear umbrella. Such a relationship would come into existence after Japan fails
to carry out a rapid and sufficient arms buildup to match China’s challenge, in-
cluding sufficient strategic nuclear weapons. Then Japan would be incorpo-
rated into China’s orbit as a de facto tributary state in a revived Sino-centric
world order. Tokyo would lose the substantial political independence that it
has enjoyed in the Western inter-state system under U. S. hegemony. Instead,
Japan would find itself with little freedom of geo-strategic action, tied tightly to
Beijing’s balancing policy against the United States in not only foreign and se-
curity policy but also economic policy. Japan’s security would be seriously de-
graded given that the tributary system does not necessarily involve the same
high level of security assurance guaranteed by security-treaty commitments
under what Beijing may see as Western international law, such as the U. S.-
Japan alliance. Neither would Beijing tolerate a Japanese arms buildup that
could challenge China’s domination. At the same time, Tokyo would have to
face U. S. foreign and security policies that were hostile to China and its de
facto tributary states, including Japan.
Under this power structure, an East Asian Community cannot exist ;
Beijing’s de facto tributary system will prevail. In this system, Tokyo would be
forced to provide Beijing with the necessary capital and technology for China’s
modernization and development, and to contribute to Beijing’s balancing policy
against the United States. On the other hand, Beijing would reinforce or rein-
stall the self-contained pacifist discourse in Japan, so that Tokyo would not de-
viate from the tributary system and challenge a revived Sino-centric order.
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4. Japan’s preferences among the five geo-strategic options
As shown in this study, the traditional Japanese state identity evolved out of
its macro-historical geo-strategic experience with the Sino-centric world. This
state identity was based on all-out rejection of subjugation to the Sino-centric
world order ; this was the bottom line in Japan’s geo-strategic decision making.
With the breakdown of that order, Japan redefined its state identity in the con-
text of the Western inter-state system, striving to protect its vital national in-
terests on a par with Western great powers. Japan’s experience in this process
was influenced primarily by its difficulties regarding how to cope with a weak,
zealously nationalistic China. The modern Japanese experience after China’s
breakdown, both before and after 1945, demonstrates that Japan needs to
maintain cooperative security relationships with the United States in general
and to secure active U. S. engagement with East Asian security in particular,
with a primary focus on how to counter China. The experience also presents
a stark precedent in which Japan took a high risk in asserting geo-strategic in-
dependence when it was cornered and without any other option. The interac-
tive causation of Japan’s state identity and past geo-strategic choices offers a
solid base to rank the five geo-strategic options discussed above.
Most preferred is Option E, in which Tokyo enjoys full sovereignty and
autonomy by abrogating the bilateral alliance with the United States and dis-
tancing from China. According to realist doctrine, this will be the top choice
of any state actor in the classical Western inter-state system. However, a
Japan-centric regional order would be only sustainable under very specific geo-
strategic and geo-economic conditions that are unlikely to materialize. In addi-
tion, in order to take necessary democratic procedures for carrying out full
arms buildup, Tokyo must terminate its self-contained pacifist discourse,
which induces strong inertia in Japanese strategic decision making. Option E
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may or may not be feasible, and involves high risks because it rests on an ideal
model that exists only in textbooks.
Ranked second is Option A, in which Tokyo continues to rely on U. S. pro-
tection China and maintains its military potential by enhancing its
economic and technological power. While distancing itself from a strong
China, this option will enable Tokyo to retain its self-contained pacifist dis-
course. This choice prevailed in the Cold War period when Washington main-
tained a robust hegemony. However, the post-Cold War U. S. unipolar
moment has apparently passed as a result of the quagmire in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, bringing about significant hegemonic decline.
Ranked third is Option C, in which Tokyo remains reliant on diminished
U. S. protection China but concurrently builds up limited military
power in a manner that does not challenge declining U. S. hegemony. Japan’s
military buildup proceeds in an inverse relationship to U. S. hegemonic de-
cline, subject to a dynamic fluctuation. Thus, the uncertainty about the degree
and rate to which U. S. hegemony will decline will precipitate hyper-active
Japanese discussion of the specific details of its necessary military buildup,
raising tensions between realist strategic assessments and the self-contained
pacifist discourse. It is reasonable that, assuming the international status quo
under a gradually declining U. S. hegemony, static analyses focus on competing
options of how to rationalize and fine-tune the Japanese military buildup. This
approach will make sense if U. S. hegemony somehow endures for an extended
period of time, but won’t hold if the hegemony should become seriously debili-
tated or cease to exist.
Ranked fourth is Option D, in which Tokyo can barely rely on evaporating
U. S. hegemony and, as a result, must appease China on many geo-economic
issues that would not immediately worsen Japan’s basic geo-strategic standing
and vital security interests yet would involve serious encroachment upon geo-
strategic interests over the long term. Also, Japan would become a marginal
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actor situated on the fringe of a Sino-centric East Asian Community that would
exert substantial centripetal influence on other East and Southeast Asian
countries. This option might accelerate China’s consolidation of geo-strategic
power, eventually resulting in fully-revived Sino-centric regional order. It
does not fit at all with the traditional Japanese state identity and would disinte-
grate the self-contained pacifist discourse in Japan. Beijing would exploit such
a scenario, encouraging Japan’s continued decline by reinforcing the geo-
strategic and geo-economic factors that forced Japan to accept this option.
Ranked fifth, or least preferred, is Option F, in which Japan totally submits
to a revived Sino-centric regional order and becomes China’s de facto tributary
state. This option also completely contradicts the traditional Japanese state
identity and will most likely be rejected.
Based on the above order of preference, however, Tokyo would surely
choose Option E (full geo-strategic independence) despite the high risks in-
volved, if it could no longer depend on U. S. hegemony and if its only other op-
tion were to become China’s tributary state (Option F). Also, Tokyo would
probably make the same choice if it was pushed into Option D (a Sino-centric
East Asian Community) with the strong prospect that Beijing would establish
a Sino-centric regional order (or domination) in the foreseeable future.
While Japan undertakes its geo-strategic decision according to its own
power calculations and state identity, Washington could exercise significant in-
fluence in the process in one specific area : the self-contained pacifist dis-
course. Washington could facilitate the debilitation of this discourse by
actively informing the Japanese general public of the evolving geo-strategic
imperatives that render a pacifist approach to Japan’s foreign and defense pol-
icy obsolete. Alternatively, Washington could reinforce the discourse by
stressing the relevancy of Japanese pacifism for the bilateral alliance. In par-
ticular, U. S. influence would be crucial if Japan had to choose between Option
C and Option D, Japan’s balancing or bandwagoning s China. With a
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well-calibrated approach, therefore, Washington, even in hegemonic decline,
would be able to help consolidate Japan’s renewed Western state identity,
which rejects regional dominance of a strong, revisionist China.
VI. Conclusion
This study began by demonstrating, from a macro-historical perspective,
that the Japanese state identity has persistently played the pivotal role in de-
termining Japan’s geo-strategic choices. Yet, as the first and second so-called
Armitage Reports show,
(35)
even relatively well-informed American Japan policy
experts have consistently failed to appreciate the Japanese state identity as a
decisive factor. The first report, published in 2000, focuses exclusively on
strengthening the U. S.Japan alliance through specific policy proposals that in-
volve operational and administrative details, but does not even mention the
critical importance of the Japanese state identity in the context of the geo-
strategic triangle of the United States, Japan, and China. Likewise, the second
report, issued in 2007, stresses the strong continued relevancy of the current
hedging strategy by the U. S.Japan alliancea rising China but fails to
grasp a dynamic of the complex strategic interaction, driven by Japan’s evolv-
ing state identity, involved in Japan’s “bandwagoning” and “balancing” 	
	
the United States and China.
This paper has explored Japan’s geo-strategic options beyond the current
hedging strategy by the U. S.Japan alliance, a strategy designed to safeguard
the two countries’ security during the uncertain transitional phase of China’s
rise. As an alternative, the study has posited a scenario in which China com-
pletes the rise to great power status without adopting Western values and
rules－instead following an active, possibly aggressive, hegemonic approach
toward East Asia. This approach stands in marked contrast to that of numer-
ous studies which focus on how to manage the uncertainty inherent in transi-
The Japanese State Identity as a Grand Strategic Imperative 93
tion.
Assuming a strong and aggressive China after its rise, this analysis has iden-
tified the future of U. S. hegemony as the primary determinant of Japan’s
geo-strategic choice-making. This is because Japan’s macro-historical geo-
strategic experience has shaped the traditional state identity in a manner to re-
ject any Chinese domination over Japan and because the modern Japanese
experience has shown that U. S. engagement with East Asia is essential for re-
gional stability consistent with Japan’s identity. Using the state identity as the
essential criterion, the study has ranked Japan’s five geo-strategic options in
order of preference.
The currently prevailing discourse on Japan’s security policy in the United
States and Japan has coincided with Option C (continuation of the U. S.Japan
alliance under a weakened U. S. hegemony and Japan’s distancing from a
strong China). This option is acceptable, if not most desirable, for Japan as
long as Washington is able to sustain its hegemony and to offer necessary
U. S. military power to secure regional stability, and as long as Japan is ex-
pected to maintain its own sufficient military forces under U. S. hegemony.
Then, all that Washington and Tokyo have to agree on is the magnitude of
Japan’s military buildup, both in quantity and quality. Washington also should
press Tokyo to address the legal obstacles to exercising its right of collective
self-defense with the United States, by encouraging the weakening of the self-
contained pacifist discourse in Japan. Washington also has to support a Japan-
centric East Asian Community while hindering the Sino-centric counterpart.
Yet, when the sustainability of Option C is in question, Washington must de-
bilitate the self-contained pacifist discourse and encourage Japan to develop
and deploy a limited nuclear arsenal. Otherwise, given Japan’s preferences,
Tokyo’s geo-strategic choice might swing to Option E (geo-strategic inde-
pendence) that entails full nuclearization. This choice would not only bring
about high economic and political costs to Tokyo but could also generate
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strong instability in the regional order, leading to a protracted disorder featur-
ing arms races, armed conflicts, and, possibly, wars between Japan and China.
With the scenario of China as a strong, revisionist power in mind, American
strategic planners must be aware that the rise and fall of U. S. hegemony plays
the pivotal role in shaping the future East Asian security order. But policy-
makers must recognize that the most preferred option for Japan as well as for
the United States, an option that requires strong U. S. hegemony, is no longer
possible for the foreseeable future. Also, they must acknowledge that a worse
option (China’s regional dominance under a weakened U. S. hegemony) and
the worst option (China’s predominance after U. S. hegemony) will open a
strategic Pandora’s box for Washington and Tokyo. Thus it is imperative for
American leaders to strive for the preservation of U. S. hegemony. If U. S. he-
gemony enters a serious and irreversible decline, Washington will have to
adopt a very cautious and detailed approach in support of Japan’s development
and possession of power projection capabilities and nuclear weapons, and to a
Japan-centered East Asian Community. Such an approach is essential to pre-
vent Japan from taking a high risk and asserting an independent state identity
and grand strategy.
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